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The Barenblatt Decision
of the Supreme Court

and the Academic Profession
By RALPH F. FUCHS
Indiana University

A student or faculty member of a college or university, unless he
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, may be required by a
legislative investigating committee to answer questions relating to his
Communist Party membership and knowledge of Party activities, if
the committee possesses previous indication of his possible membership.
Such is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
recent Barenblatt case,1 sustaining a conviction for contempt of Congress

on account of Barenblatt's refusal on First Amendment grounds to
answer certain questions of a subcommittee of the House Un-American
Activities Committee in 1954.

Barenblatt was a graduate student and teaching fellow at the
University of Michigan during the period 1947-50, to which the questions related,2 and the Committee, besides inquiring about Communist
Party membership, asked Barenblatt whether he had been a member
of the Haldane Club, an allegedly Communist Party offshoot in the
University. Previous testimony before the subcommittee had named
him as a member of the Party and of the Club.

The American Association of University Professors had filed a
brief amicus curiae in the case, requesting the Court to decide that
compulsion to answer the questions, under the circumstances of the
case, was either unauthorized or unconstitutional. The Association's
brief challenged the existence of authorization by the House of Representatives of the Un-American Activities Committee's investigation
into education, as well as the Committee's authority to put the specific
x360\J. S. 109 (June 8, 1959).

•Barenblatt was an instructor at Vassar College at the time he was summoned

to appear before the subcommittee, but this fact was not significant in relation to
the case, except as it linked his graduate training to membership in the academic
profession.
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334 American Association of University Professors
questions asked of Barenblatt. The Court sustained the Committee on
both points. The brief further argued that such an investigation, if
authorized by Congress without more justification than appeared in the
case, would violate the First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, or association, in colleges and universities. This contention
was based on the need for academic institutions to have independence
from external pressures, the minor extent of the actual threat from
Communism in higher education in this country, and the existing academic safeguards against improper activities in colleges and universities.
Like the prior contentions, this one was unsuccessful.
It is important both to grasp the narrowness of the constitutional
point actually decided by the Court and to gauge the possible significance

of the decision on this point in relation to wider issues. The decision

was by a 5-4 majority. The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan for the
Court and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black articulate the

philosophies underlying their opposite conclusions. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the Black opinion, and
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a brief separate opinion, expressed his partial
agreement with it and his support of the result it urged.

In justifying the Court's decision, the majority opinion relies
heavily on prior judicial and legislative recognition of the purpose of
the Communist Party to secure the ultimate overthrow of the government by force and violence. It recognizes the power of the legislature
to enact laws to deal with this threat, and therefore to conduct inquiries

relevant to such legislation. The case does not involve and the opinion
does not pass upon the validity of criminal statutes or other govern-

mental measures to combat subversive activities.3 The issue decided
relates to the power of investigation to determine the need for legislation.
The opinion points out that the investigation here was not of a "dragnet"

variety, calling persons before the Committee indiscriminately as witnesses ; and it is in light of this fact that the power to compel Barenblatt's
testimony is sustained.

The dissenting opinion, as to the constitutional issue, rests primarily on the absolute terms of the First Amendment, which provides
that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of speech, press,
or assembly. The opinion asserts that the inquiries of the Un-American
Activities Committee, including this one, "do precisely that" by exposing

witnesses to obloquy and public scorn, thus penalizing them for their
exercising of freedoms supposedly protected by the First Amendment.
3 Certain prior decisions dealing with particular problems in this area are
reviewed in Carr's, "Academic Freedom, the American Association of University
Professors, and the United States Supreme Court," Spring, 1959 AAUP Bulletin,

at p. 5.
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The opinion is an eloquent assertion of the importance of freedom of
political discussion and association, and of the danger of permitting
even small inroads into this freedom, because of the demonstrated
likelihood of their expansion into major ones. The opinion protests
against the Court's application of a balancing process - weighing national security claims against the claims of free speech and association in order to determine the validity of an abridgement of expression and
association. It asserts, however, that even if that method of reasoning
is to be applied, the Court's use of it "completely leaves out the real
interest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a whole in
being able to join organizations, advocate causes, and make political
'mistakes' without later being subjected to governmental penalties for
having dared to think for themselves."
In justifying the balancing process for deciding the case, the majority opinion quotes a sentence from the Association's amicus brief,

which recognizes that "the claims of academic freedom cannot be

asserted unqualifiedly" and must be weighed against other social interests
in determining the validity of governmental action affecting those claims.

"Academic freedom" as used in the brief had reference to a complex of

acts and relationships. The opinion points out that the inquiry in
the Barenblatt case did not extend to the content of academic instruc-

tion, as did the questioning in the earlier Sweezy case.4 If it had, a
decision that the inquiry was barred would almost certainly have resulted. The opinion recognizes the importance of academic freedom
in the constitutional scheme in the following passage :

Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching
that is pursued in any of our educational institutions. When academic
teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom, so essential to
the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be on
the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain. But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded
from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into
matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain

merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.

If First Amendment issues are to be decided by a process of
balancing broad social interests, there is still both opportunity and need
for definite propositions relating to the immunity of specific, narrowly

defined freedoms from particular kinds of legislative invasion. The

opinion of the Court, in the passage just quoted, enunciates such a
proposition in relation to inquiries into the content of instruction.
4 In that case, the constitutional issue relating to the First Amendment was
discussed but not decided. See the article by Carr, cited in the preceding footnote.
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Others might be stated, and may come to be adopted by the Court, with
relation to constitutional protection of the individual from criminal
punishment or legally imposed loss of employment on account of beliefs,

utterances, or association involving the expression of views of any
kind, including views which favor political revolution. Certainly within
academic institutions and the academic profession, the absoluteness of

freedom of belief, utterance, and association for the expression of
belief must be unflinchingly maintained, and governmental efforts to

invade it must be resisted.

The Court in the Barenblatt case, following previous official conclusions and prevailing opinion, accepts the view that the Communist
Party's purposes, pursued secretly to some extent, include illegal action
as distinguished from discussion, argument, and political action. In-

vestigation into the extent of association with it can therefore be
made, except where the individual interests at stake, or abuses in the
investigative process such as the Court said were absent here, weigh
more heavily in the balancing process than the governmental interest

sought to be served. Here, the balance was struck in favor of the

latter.

The determination of this last question is the principal inadequacy
of the Barenblatt decision from the standpoint of the academic profession.

The opinion does not deal expressly with the aspects of higher education to which the Association's brief pointed as factors needing to be
estimated. "One of the essential preconditions of academic freedom,"
the brief asserted, "is unhampered control by the university over employment of its faculty/' which should extend to the training of "candi-

dates and novitiates," such as graduate students. The brief recited
AAUP experience and developments set forth in recent literature,
embracing denial or termination of academic employment as a result
of the Barenblatt type of inquiry.5 It also pointed to the tendency of
investigations such as those of the Un-American Activities Committee

to lead students in particular "to prefer a posture of safety to the
exercise of their freedoms." In the light of these factors, such investigations into Communism in higher education would better have been
stopped by a constitutional barrier than allowed to continue, and the
"academic autonomy," for which the brief argued, have been permitted
free scope to supply needed safeguards against subversion in the colleges.

At the very least, recognition might have been given to the need for
considering the repressive effects upon higher education of inquiries
such as that in this case, before coming to a decision.
5 No assertion has been made that there was such a result in the Barenblatt

case itself.
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In NAACP v. Alabama? decided a year earlier, the Court cast
the balance in favor of organizational freedom against official scrutiny
into membership, because of the adverse consequences which disclosure
of the names of Negro members of a hated organization would have
produced in Alabama. Although these consequences were more obvious
and dramatic than the partial paralysis of independent thought and
expression which now prevails in some academic circles, they were not
more insidious or harmful.

It does not follow from the unconvincing nature of the reasoning
of the majority of the Court that the dissenters who took an absolute
position against any inquiry into "political" association are self-evidently
correct. Wide-ranging legislative investigations have produced much

good in this country, and restraints upon them must be kept to a
minimum. It is certainly not clear that political association, carried
on in secret, can be so definitely separated from indicated illegal activity

of the same organizations as to permit immunizing it altogether
from legislative investigations. The coercive effect upon individuals
of Congressional investigations into Communism, which Mr. Justice
Black's opinion amply demonstrates, results from an inflamed state of
public opinion as well as from the disclosures themselves. Although
the investigations have been deliberately designed to stimulate this
state of opinion and to produce maximum effect, counter-efforts in
behalf of justice to individuals can be carried on in the area of public
opinion, to which legislators are directly responsible. Hence the absence
of a rigid rule against investigations of this type need not spell the end
of basic constitutional freedoms.

In the counter-efforts that should be made, as well as in future
constitutional litigation, other recent important judicial holdings can
be put to use. These are to the effect that (1) legal action adverse to
the individual cannot be based solely on past membership in the Communist Party, without reference to personal involvement in illegal
activity;7 (2) refusal to take a broad oath disclaiming membership,
including innocent membership, in organizations which advocate overthrow of the government by force or illegal means cannot be in itself
a ground of exclusion from office;8 (3) a state investigation involving
compulsory disclosure, which is likely to result in coercion against lawful association, is unconstitutional ;9 and (4) the exercise of compulsion
•357 U. S. 449 (1958).

7 Schware v. State Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957).

*Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); see also Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 512 (1958).
9 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
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field by a clear showing of relevance of the inquiry to a valid legislative
purpose.10

Repressive measures of many varieties affecting academic freedom

remain in effect on both the state and the national level. Many of
these are far more serious than any Congressional investigations now
being conducted. Among them are the various disclaimer oath laws,
the laws which require faculty members to disclose their organizational
affiliations as a condition of holding their official positions, and the
laws which render it criminal to belong to organizations that "advocate"
or even "believe in" the overthrow of the government by violence or

illegal means. Not only are these measures ordinarily vague and

uncertain in their operation, but they are symbolic of a wider legislative

purpose to repress unorthodox views and associations, especially in

the field of education. Efforts to combat these measures should be

continued and intensified, lest the policy of enforcing conformity become
permanent.

By and large, the academic profession can be far more vigorous in
relation to these matters than in general it has been. The result in the
Barenblatt case can be a call to more effective action, rather than a
ground of discouragement. The current widespread effort to secure
the repeal of the oath provision of the National Defense Education Act,
with the discernibly favorable effect of that effort on public opinion, is

a heartening indication of what can be done.
10 Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U. S. 234 (1957). Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, decided the same day as
Barenblatt v. United States, does much to weaken the force of prior holdings on

this point and the previous one, however, and goes far to justify the anticipation of

Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Barenblatt, that the holding there
could easily lead to widespread extensions. The compulsion to disclose in the

Uphaus case, which the Court upheld, involved the names of numerous people whose
possible connections with the Communist Party had not been indicated in a broad
investigation of "subversion" embracing a variety of organizations and individuals.

Mr. Justice Brennan's careful dissent in Uphaus reveals tellingly how far the

majority of the Court actually went. The Court seems in reality to be developing in
this area a familiar pattern of inconsistent lines of decisions, either of which can

be drawn upon in the future.
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